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and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures* 
We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor 
coordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor’s 
incentives leads to excessive ‘rollover failure’ by creditors when sovereign 
default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by 
international sovereign bankruptcy procedures, involving ‘contractibility’ of 
sovereign debtor’s payoffs, suspension of convertibility in a ‘discovery’ phase 
and penalties in case of malfeasance. In relation to the current debate, this is 
more akin to the IMF’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism than the 
Collective Action Clauses which some promote as an alternative. 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
In criticising the conventional wisdom ?  the Washington Consensus ? 
Guillermo Calvo of Inter-American Development Bank argues that emerging 
market finance is subject to market failures with potentially disastrous 
consequences. At the UTDT summer workshop in Buenos Aires in August 
2002 he proposed that whether or not a theory of sovereign debt crisis 
includes ‘sudden stops’ should be a crucial test of its empirical relevance for 
emerging market finance (see Calvo et al (2002)). In his recent book on the 
international monetary system, Tirole (2002, p. ix-x) evidently takes the same 
perspective: he begins by referring to the wide consensus that has emerged 
among economists that ‘capital account liberalization...was unambiguously 
good. Good for the debtor countries, good for the world economy’ but goes on 
to note ‘that consensus has been shattered lately. A number of capital account 
liberalizations have been followed by spectacular foreign exchange and 
banking crises’. 
 
Following Russia’s partial foreign debt repudiation in August 1998, for 
example, generous inflows to Latin America came to a standstill; and 
sovereign interest rate spreads rose to over 1600 basis points on the 
Emerging Market Bond index (EMBI+). These developments ?  together with 
the collapsing currencies and soaring sovereign spreads facing many Latin 
American countries in 2001/2 ?  have put in question traditional explanations 
for financial crises, based on current account and fiscal deficits. They suggest 
the need to focus on the intrinsic behaviour of capital markets.  
 
The focus of this Paper is on how problems of creditor coordination interact 
with debtors’ incentives to generate excessive crises. In the academic 
literature, these issues are typically treated separately. In explaining ‘bank 
runs’, for example, the classic paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
demonstrates the possibility of multiple equilibria in financial markets, but 
takes as given the structure of demand deposit contracts (i.e. the right of 
depositors to withdraw on demand) and the choice of investments by the 
bank. To help select the ‘good’ equilibrium, three institutional mechanisms 
were discussed ?  provision of liquidity, suspension of convertibility and deposit 
insurance. Analogous coordination problems arise in connection with 
emerging-market bonds and similar proposals have recently been made with 
respect to sovereign debt. Stanley Fischer (1999), Radelet and Sachs (1998) 
and Truman (2001), for example, have emphasized official provision of 
liquidity; while Krugman (1998) called for capital outflow controls to protect 
East Asian currencies (i.e. a suspension of convertibility). There has not been 
much talk of explicit insurance, Soros (1998) and Jeanne (2001) being 
exceptions; but an additional possibility has been widely discussed, that of 
revising the nature of sovereign debt contracts themselves. Eichengreen and 
Portes (1995), Buchheit and Gulati (2000) and Taylor (2002) have advocated 
the insertion of collective action clauses to assist creditor coordination. 
 
Proposals like these, designed to solve creditor coordination problems, have 
been criticised for failing to take into account their effect on sovereign debtors’ 
incentives. Barro (1998, p.18), for example, suggested that bailouts can 
increase the probability of sovereign default, stating that ‘bailouts increase 
“moral hazard” by rewarding and encouraging bad policies by governments 
and excessive risk-taking by banks’. With reference to $42 billion support 
package for Brazil in 1998, for example, Barro asked: ‘How did the Brazilians 
qualify for this support? They did so mostly by not exercising sound fiscal 
policies. If their policies had been better, they would not be in their current 
difficulties and would not qualify for IMF money’. After further discussion of the 
bailouts for Mexico and Russia, he concluded ‘the IMF might consider 
changing its name to the IMH ?  the Institute for Moral Hazard’. Typically, 
debtor’s moral hazard has been considered in a separate strand of the 
literature that focuses on the use of punishment strategies in models of 
repeated interaction. In Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), for example, trade 
sanctions are the punishment mechanism to prevent strategic default. But 
since their bargaining mode assumes a single creditor lending to a single 
debtor, creditor coordination problems are not discussed. Nor are they 
addressed in Kletzer and Wright (2000), who use a repeated game model to 
study how restricting access to capital markets can check moral hazard. 
 
A convincing treatment of sovereign debt crises and their resolution needs to 
combine creditor coordination and debtor incentives in a consistent 
framework. This Paper develops such a framework. It is structured as follows: 
 
To set the scene, we first describe the two principal proposals for improving 
the international financial architecture currently under active consideration, the 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) advocated by the IMF and 
the Collective Action Clauses recommended by the US Treasury. 
 
The analysis follows in section 3 with a canonical two-player game of creditor 
coordination where neither creditor can make a credible commitment not to 
quit where there is a default, even when shocks are temporary. This 
coordination game has three Nash equilibria: two in pure strategies (stay, 
stay) and (quit, quit), and a third in mixed strategies. Solving creditor 
coordination problems in sovereign bond markets is, however, subject to a 
moral hazard constraint: that debtors must retain the incentive to service their 
debts. In this model of sovereign illiquidity with three Nash equilibria facing 
creditors, it is quite likely that this incentive constraint rules out the no-crisis 
equilibrium, and either the mixed strategy equilibrium or the pure strategy 
where all creditors quit will be selected, depending on how severe the 
incentive problem is. In general, however, the termination probability is higher 
than necessary for incentive purposes, i.e. there are too many crises. 
 
Though, in general, interest rates are treated as given, we discuss briefly how 
they may be determined endogenously, depending on equilibrium selected. In 
particular, we indicate how the model might be calibrated to the data, with 
parameter chosen so as to generate sovereign spreads that vary over a range 
running from 300 to 7000 basis points (see Table 5). The possible perverse 
effects of unregulated financial liberalization are also discussed using this 
framework. 
 
Our analysis implies that bailouts alone will not solve the underlying causes of 
sovereign debt crises; and that the market equilibrium needed to provide the 
right incentives is excessively prone to financial crisis (i.e. to sudden stops in 
capital flows). How can bond markets be made more efficient? We consider a 
bankruptcy procedure involving temporary stay on creditor litigation and 
discovery process for determining the underlying causes of default. A key 
element of the procedure is that when the sovereign debtor in default is found 
to have made little or no effort, its private payoffs will be reduced ex post. To 
provide the right incentives, it is crucial that the mechanism for doing this 
should have been agreed ex ante, as would be true if a ruled-governed public 
agency is involved. Moreover, we argue that privately issued bond contracts 
are unlikely to achieve the same result. 
 
The mechanism we describe incorporates features of the bankruptcy 
procedures advocated by the IMF (Krueger, 2002) ?  though, unlike the IMF’s 
proposal, it is not restricted to cases of ‘insolvency’. We conclude, therefore, 
that the institutional approach to sovereign debt restructuring proposed by the 
IMF is, in principle, capable of increasing bond market efficiency. What the 
rules should be ?  and whether the IMF as currently constituted is the 
appropriate public agency to implement them ?  are policy issues that remain 
to be discussed. 
 
In related work, Tirole (2002) has recently emphasised the ‘common agency 
problems’ affecting sovereign borrowing: the contracting externalities, which 
may lead to over-borrowing and excessive short-term debt, and the collective 
action problems that prevent efficient rollover and restructuring. Though our 
focus is somewhat different ?  we take both the amount and maturity structure 
of sovereign debt as given ?  the analytical approach we use has many 
features in common, including the assumption that there are debtor payoffs 
which cannot be secured by creditors (i.e. are not `contractible’) and the links 
that are established between ex-post resolution procedures and ex-ante 
debtor incentives. Our institutional recommendation for increasing the 
contractibility of the debtor payoffs is not unlike Tirole’s proposal to increase 
the ‘pledgable income’ of the sovereign debtor. Like Tirole, we have focused 
on the problems that can arise from contracts that pose problems of creditor 
coordination. For simplicity we have assumed that creditors all share the same 
information: but the information asymmetries stressed by Calvo would (as the 
Appendix suggests) greatly enrich the analysis. 
 
The framework developed here could be used to look at contagion in capital 
markets. Masson (1999, p.267), for instance, argues, ‘pure contagion involves 
changes in expectations that is not related to country’s macroeconomic 
fundamentals’. To include contagion on this definition, we need only relax the 
assumption that the market selects the most efficient incentive compatible 
equilibrium between creditors: a move from a mixed strategy equilibrium to the 
pure strategy of quitting unconnected with any change in fundamentals would 
count as contagion on Masson’s definition (and, as Table 5 indicates, could 
double sovereign spreads). In future research, we intend to include the 
determination of sovereign spreads within the analysis; and to combine 
creditor heterogeneity and insolvency shocks with debtor moral hazard. 
Another useful extension would be to take account of the politics of decision-
making within a debtor country and how it interacts with the debt crises. 
 
Introduction
Following Mexico’s moratorium on its external debt payments in 1982, virtually all
voluntary lending to emerging markets by commercial banks ceased (Buchheit, 1999); and
the eighties came to be known as the ‘lost decade’ in Latin America. When lending to these
markets restarted in the 1990s, as a result of the Brady Plan, lenders sought to avoid any
repeat of the write-downs imposed on commercial banks by swapping loans for sovereign
bonds. Unlike bank lending, however, Brady bonds issued under New York law cannot be
restructured without unanimous consent. While this may be a useful check on debtor’s
‘moral hazard’, it means that emerging markets are exposed to financial crisis due to
creditor panic or extraneous shocks to their debt service capacity. Nevertheless, for some
years, capital kept flowing to emerging markets at modest rates of interest – underwritten
in part by an IMF policy of (ever increasing) bail-outs. Following Russia’s partial foreign
debt repudiation in August 1998, however, generous inflows to Latin America once again
came to a standstill; and sovereign interest rate spreads rose to over 1600 basis points on
the EMBI index, remaining above 700 basis points for the next two years.
These developments – together with the collapsing currencies and soaring sovereign
spreads facing many Latin American countries in 2001/2 – have put in question traditional
explanations for financial crises, based on current account and fiscal deficits. They suggest
the need to focus on the intrinsic behaviour of capital markets (Calvo et al, 2002). Why do
sudden stops to the flows of finance occur? What are the economic consequences, and the
implications for institutional design?
In this paper, we focus on how problems of creditor co-ordination interact with debtor’s
incentives to generate excessive crises. In the literature, however, these issues are typically
treated separately. In explaining bank runs, for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
demonstrated the possibility of multiple equilibria in financial markets, taking as given the
structure of demand deposit contracts ( i.e. the right of depositors to withdraw on demand)
and the choice of investments by the bank. To help select the “good” equilibrium, three
institutional mechanisms were discussed – provision of liquidity, suspension of
convertibility and deposit insurance. Analogous co-ordination problems arise in connection
with emerging-market bonds footnote and similar proposals have recently been made.
Stanley Fischer (1999), Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Truman (2001), for example, have
emphasised official provision of liquidity; while Krugman (1998) called for capital outflow
controls to protect East Asian currencies (i.e. a suspension of convertibility). There has not
been much talk of explicit insurance, Soros (1998) and Jeanne (2001) being exceptions: but
an additional possibility has been widely discussed, that of revising the nature of sovereign
debt contracts themselves. Eichengreen and Portes (1995), Buchheit and Gulati (2000) and
Taylor (2002) have advocated the insertion of collective action clauses to assist creditor
co-ordination.
Such proposals to solve creditor coordination problems have been criticised for failing
to take into account their effect on sovereign debtors’ incentives. Barro (1998, p.18), for
example, suggested that bail-outs can increase the probability of sovereign default, stating
that “ bailouts increase ‘moral hazard’ by rewarding and encouraging bad policies by
governments and excessive risk-taking by banks”. With reference to $42 billion package
for Brazil in 1998, for example, Barro asked: “How did the Brazilians qualify for this
support? They did so mostly by not exercising sound fiscal policies. If their policies had
been better, they would not be in their current difficulties and would not qualify for IMF
money”. After further discussion of the bailouts for Mexico and Russia, he concluded “the
IMF might consider changing its name to the IMH– the Institute for Moral Hazard”.
Typically, however, debtor’s moral hazard has been considered in a separate strand of
the literature which focuses on the use of punishment strategies in models of repeated
interaction. In Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), for example, trade sanctions are the punishment
mechanism to prevent strategic default. But since their bargaining model assumes a single
creditor lending to a single debtor, creditor coordination problems are not discussed. Nor
are they addressed in Kletzer and Wright (2000), who use a repeated game model to study
how restricting access to capital markets can check moral hazard. footnote 
A convincing treatment of sovereign debt crises and their resolution needs to combine
creditor co-ordination and debtor incentives in a consistent framework. In this paper, we
develop such a framework. It implies that bail-outs do not solve the underlying causes of a
sovereign debt crisis; and that the market equilibrium needed to provide the right incentives
is excessively prone to financial crisis (i.e. to sudden stops in capital flows). To improve on
the equilibrium market outcome, we analyse an international bankruptcy procedure as
ex-ante commitment device that involves (a) ensuring partial contractibility of sovereign
debtor’s payoffs, (b) temporary suspension of convertibility in a ‘discovery’ phase and (c)
ex-post transfers. The mechanism we describe incorporates features of the bankruptcy
procedures advocated by the IMF (Krueger, 2002) – though, unlike the IMF’s proposal, it
is not restricted to cases of ‘insolvency’. On the other hand, it differs sharply from the
‘crisis insurance fund’ footnote recommended by Jeanne (2001) who assumes that solving
the creditor coordination problem has no impact on the debtor’s incentives.
In related work, Tirole (2002) has recently emphasised the ‘common agency problems’
affecting sovereign borrowing: the contracting externalities which may lead to
over-borrowing and excessive short-term debt, and the collective action problems that
prevent efficient roll-over and restructuring. Though our focus is somewhat different – we
take both the amount and maturity structure of sovereign debt as given – the analytical
approach we use has many features in common, including the assumption that there are
debtor payoffs which cannot be secured by creditors (i.e. are not ‘contractible’) and the
links that are established between ex-post resolution procedures and ex-ante debtor
incentives. Our institutional recommendation for increasing the contractibility of the debtor
payoffs is not unlike Tirole’s proposal to increase the ‘pledgable income’ of the sovereign
debtor.
While in the main body of the paper, we have, for simplicity, assumed that shocks are
temporary and creditors have symmetric (but incomplete) information about these shocks
and the actions chosen by the debtor, the appendix discusses the issues that arise when
creditors are unsure and disagree whether the shock is temporary or permanent  footnote .
The model and results in the Appendix share with Calvo (1999) the focus on asymmetric
information and heterogenous creditors as causes of excessive crises.
The paper is structured as follows. To set the scene, we first describe the two principal
proposals for improving the international financial architecture currently under active
consideration, the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) advocated by the
IMF and the Collective Action Clauses recommended by the US Treasury. The analysis
begins in section 3 with a canonical two-player game of creditor coordination where
neither creditor can make a credible commitment not to play a grab race, even when shocks
are temporary. To select between the multiple equilibria of the creditor game, we use
debtor’s incentives – rather than sunspots or risk dominance. To this end, we present a
generic model of debtor moral hazard, where the sovereign debtor cannot credibly (or
verifiably) commit to putting in effort ex-ante, due to either sovereign immunity or
non-contractibility of debtor payoffs; nor can he commit to ex-post bargaining in the event
of default. Then we examine how the equilibrium selection in the creditor coordination
problem interacts with the sovereign debtor’s incentives and show that solving the
sovereign debtor’s incentive problems requires excessive ‘project termination’ by creditors
when sovereign default occurs. Though, in general, we treat interest rates as given, we
discuss briefly how they may be determined endogenously, depending on equilibrium
selected. Lastly, we consider potential improvements involving either SDRM or changes to
contracts. The Appendix contains a model of asymmetric information and excessive crisis.
Sovereign debt restructuring: Two
mechanisms
Collective action clauses in bond contracts
After the Mexican crisis of 1994/5, the Deputies of the G-10 made a number of
recommendations to facilitate crisis management (Group of Ten Report, 1996). As regards
liquidity provision, for example, they suggested that the IMF should ‘lend into arrears’ for
countries whose domestic policies were deemed acceptable. For the private sector, they
commended changes to contractual provisions covering sovereign debt (so as to allow for
the collective representation of bondholders; for supermajority voting on changing the
terms and conditions of the debt contract; and for sharing of proceeds among creditors).
Such ideas had found academic support in the work of Eichengreen and Portes (1995) who
also recommended the creation of a Bondholders Council to help negotiate debt
reconstruction. But markets have proved very slow to respond. To date, only two sovereign
debtors have incorporated such clauses in their foreign currency liabilities, but these are the
UK and Canada and not the emerging market debtors for whom the recommendation was
intended – probably because of a signalling problem (Eichengreen, 1999).
The increasingly desperate case of Argentina has re-opened the debate on sovereign
debt restructuring. footnote Thus in April 2002, John Taylor (2002), on behalf of the US
Treasury, argued forcefully for the inclusion of collective action clauses in the emerging
market debt. To help overcome the problem of transition, the US Treasury proposed adding
substantial “carrots and sticks” as incentives to change. (Positive incentives could include
lower interest rate charges when borrowing from the IMF; and further financial
inducements to carry out bond swaps on the existing stock: as a punishment, the insertion
of such clauses could be made a precondition of seeking an IMF program.) To tackle
problems of asset diversity, it was proposed that such clauses could be included in bank
debt as well. For problems of aggregation across creditor classes, it was proposed that
disputes between creditors could be handled in an arbitration process provided for in the
contracts themselves. An alternative suggestion from Morgan Chase and Co. is that of a
two-step bond swap where the first step is designed to achieve uniformity of claim, and the
second step is the actual restructuring, Bartholomew, Stern, and Liuzzi (2002).
A sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
Jeffrey Sachs’s response to the Mexican crisis of 1994/5 was that sovereigns needed the
basic protections available to corporate borrowers and he proposed an international
bankruptcy court for sovereign debt restructuring. Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002)
provide an account of this and other proposals for revising an international financial
architecture to incorporate bankruptcy-style procedures.
The new Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism first outlined by Anne Krueger in
November 2001 was clearly inspired by the analogy of the US corporate bankruptcy
procedures (Chapter 11, in particular). While collective action clauses also embody similar
provisions for supermajority voting, the IMF claims that SDRM is necessary to solve the
problems of aggregation and of transition discussed above (Anne Krueger, 2002, p.14).
The evolution of corporate debt restructuring and its
implications
Buchheit and Gulati (2002) contrast the different paths taken by Britain and United
States in respect of corporate debt restructuring. As indicated in Column 1 of the table
below, UK creditors inserted collective action clauses into their bonds in the nineteenth
century; but – because these clauses were not acceptable under New York law – the US
adopted court-ordered bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Buchheit and Gulati argue that the global economy should now follow the lead of the
London bond market by adopting collective action clauses, implemented if neccessary by
‘exit consent swaps’, i.e. bond exchanges where creditors accepting the new contract agree
to changes which render the old contracts less attractive. These links between corporate
history and the current debate on sovereign debt are summarised in Table 1.
[Table 1. Debt restructuring: Two approaches]
This historical summary may suggest that collective action clauses and court-ordered
procedures are substitutes. But the London capital market has subsequently gone on to
develop court-ordered bankruptcy procedures analogous to those in the US, so they may
well be complementary (Miller, 2002). It may be easier in the short run to solve the
transition problem of modifying bond contracts than it is to revise the IMF Articles of
Agreement; there may nevertheless be advantages in having an explicit sovereign debt
restructuring mechanism. The simple model of sovereign debt that follows abstracts from
the aggregation and transition problems which play such an important role in the current
debate: it does suggest, however, that sovereign bankruptcy procedures combined with
IMF-style conditionality can better achieve the commitment needed than would collective
action clauses inserted into bond contracts.
Creditor co-ordination without moral hazard
Take the case of a sovereign embarking on a bond-financed investment project, costing
K, which lasts only two periods. All the finance is supplied by two investors, investing b
each, who are promised returns of r in the first period and 1  r in the second period. So
long as resources available cover these payments (i.e. cash flow in period 1 is greater than
2rb and cash flow in period 2 is greater than 1  r2b), all is well and the project will run
to completion.
[Fig.1. Timeline of events: Liquidity shocks]
Consider what happens if an unanticipated, exogenous shock (‘bad luck’) lowers the
capacity to pay in period one below the amount that is due to bond holders under their
contract. If it is strictly a shock to liquidity, which is what we assume here, then project net
worth will be unchanged. One example might be a country hit by contagion where the
funds earmarked for debt service are suddenly withdrawn (as for Korea in 1998); another
would be a sovereign debtor in a ‘credit chain’ forced into default by delays in payment by
its creditors. Since failure to comply with the terms of the debt contract constitutes
technical default, each creditor is entitled to accelerate its claim, demanding the capital sum
as well as the current coupon owed in period 1, i.e. technical default makes the debt
‘callable’ in period 1 and exposes the sovereign to the risk of a liquidity crisis.
(Acceleration of the claim in this way normally requires a minimum percentage of creditors
to act, usually 25%: but in our two-creditor model, one is enough.)
The co-ordination game facing the two creditors is shown in Table 2 below where the
actions of Creditor 1 (Quit, Stay) are indicated by rows 1 and 2 respectively; likewise for
Creditor 2 by the columns. In the cells showing the resulting payoffs, those for Creditor 1
are given first.
[Table 2. How Payoffs depend on Creditor Co-ordination]
Symbols used and key assumptions made in determining the payoffs are as follows.
First, if either creditor accelerates its claim, the project will end (i.e. there is a minimum
level of resources K1  K required for continuation, and 1  rb  K − K1 where Q  K
is the recovery amount if the project is terminated in period 1. Second, the creditor who
accelerates when the other does not, reckons to recover either his initial investment b plus
interest rb or the full quit value minus the privately borne legal costs of quitting L – leaving
the other creditor with the residual, if any, as in a grab race for a firm’s assets where
liquidation allows the first mover to exit without much loss of value but liquidation is
costly for other creditors. Third, if both quit, they each pay legal fees, L, and split the
expected recovery amount equally between themselves. (Most bargaining solutions support
the latter assumption, including those of Nash and Kalai - Smorodinsky.) Last of all, we
assume that unpaid interest is rolled-up and added to the coupon in period 2, so there is no
loss of value to the bondholders if the project continues. Thus, if both creditors decide to
stay, the payoffs are as shown in the bottom right cell.
As is evident after normalising the payoffs footnote (see Table 3, where 1    0  
), this coordination game has three Nash equilibria, two in pure strategies (Stay, Stay) –
with unit payoffs and (Quit, Quit) with zero payoff – and a third in mixed strategies where
each creditor quits with probability q  1−1−− . The payoffs of the normalised game are
shown in Fig.2 together with three equilibria indicated at A, B and C. Pure strategy
equilibrium A represents a total coordination failure among creditors; and the mixed
strategy equilibrium B represents a partial coordination failure.
[Table 3. Normalised expected, discounted payoffs for the co-ordination game]
What quit rates might one expect in the mixed strategy equilibrium? In their discussion
of sovereign spreads, Cline and Barnes (1997) use a recovery rate of 0.5. If,
correspondingly, one was to assume that the recovery value if the project is liquidated in
the first period is sufficient to repay only one of the two creditors i.e. Q  1  rb, and
that the legal fee faced by any creditor accelerating his claim is equal to 10 % i.e.
L  0.11  rb, we find that, in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the individual quit rate is
0.2 and the continuation probability is 0.64. In the case, the pay-offs and equilibria will
appear as in Fig.2.
[Fig. 2. Discounted expected payoff in period 1: The creditor co-ordination game (with
normalised payoffs)]
How is one to select between these equilibria? One possible answer is that the
equilibrium is selected by sunspots. Sunspots are random, payoff-irrelevant states of nature
which are publicly observed and are used by creditors to coordinate their expectations and
actions (see, for instance, Jeanne, 2001, Peck and Shell, forthcoming). This approach
implies that sovereign debt crisis occur with positive probability: but the probability is
entirely independent of the underlying economic fundamentals – an aspect which Morris
and Shin (1998) criticise.
A second approach might be to focus on equilibria in pure strategies and use risk
dominance as the selection criterion used by creditors. Note that, in this context, quitting is
risk dominant when the gain to being the first mover is the creditor grab race is relatively
large. footnote (Let  and 1 −  be the probabilities that player 1 attaches to the other
player quitting and staying, respectively. Then expected payoffs to quitting and staying for
player 1 are 1 −  and 1 − 1 − . The condition for quitting to be strictly risk
dominant (i.e. 1 −   1 − 1 − ) is that ||  1 − .)
A more satisfactory theory of which equilibrium will be chosen lies, we believe, in the
need to provide appropriate incentives for the debtor, which is what we examine in the next
section. While the main body of the paper deals only with the case of two creditors, the
Appendix examines the general case and shows that the key features – the existence of two
pure strategy Nash equilibria and an other mixed strategy equilibrium– continue to hold
with n identical creditors. Second issue discussed in the Appendix is the extension of the
creditor coordination game to the case where the shock on the country’s fundamentals is
not temporary. Where, conditional on default, there is incomplete information and
disagreement within creditors about whether the shock is temporary or permanent, it is
possible to show that, at equilibrium, there is inefficient termination of the project as
well. footnote 
Sovereign borrowing with moral hazard
Selecting equilibrium without taking account of debtor’s behaviour is inappropriate if
different solutions to the creditor coordination problem alter incentives of the sovereign
debtor. If the probability of project termination were reduce to zero, for instance, this could
have the perverse consequence of actually increasing the possibility of sovereign debt
crises, as the sovereign debtor uses the money borrowed from creditors unwisely, Barro
(1998). It is possible, therefore, that a positive probability of termination may be needed to
solve the moral hazard problem.
The model of debtors moral hazard developed here is of a small open economy where,
as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989b), the interest rate at which the sovereign can borrow in
world markets is fixed. (For simplicity, dynamic interactions between creditors and
sovereign debtors such as those involved in models of reputation are ignored footnote .)
Assume as before that the sovereign issues debt in period 0 which promises an interest
coupon in period 1 and repayment the capital sum together with a second interest coupon in
period 2. But before the first coupon becomes due, there are two events that may lead to
default. First the debtor has to choose a level of effort, either good and bad; and second an
independently-determined negative shock arrives with probability p. Since we are still
looking at liquidity crises, bad effort in this context involves condoning (or causing) cash
flows to be temporarily reduced so that debt interest due cannot be paid on time. (It might
involve those in power shipping cash overseas in a flight of capital which leads to default,
for example.) We assume that either bad effort or a negative exogenous shock is sufficient
to cause default – but which of these is not immediately evident. If the cause of the
technical default is revealed fairly soon (‘early’) i.e. before creditors decide to stay or
withdraw, the delay is not significant. But the problem of debtor’s moral hazard arises
when creditors have to decide whether to stay or withdraw before revelation takes place,
see Fig.3.
[Fig.3. Timeline of events]
There are four possible out-turns in period 1, as shown in Fig.4 below, where it is
assumed that with good effort plus good luck the coupon can be paid, but not otherwise. If
coupon is paid on time, of course, creditors have no option to terminate the loan, and the
project continues to completion. But when the coupon is not paid, creditors can accelerate.
[Fig.4. Events prior to default or no default in period 1]
It is assumed that creditors are able to distinguish between a default caused by bad luck
plus bad effort and defaults due to only one of these factors; but that they are unable to
distinguish between cases of the latter. So, as the circle in Fig. 3 indicates, they are unable
to distinguish between default due to a bad shock (for example, a delay in receipt of
payments due to the sovereign in period 1) combined with good effort, and one due to just
bad effort - with no shock (capital flight , for example).
In the subgame following default, the co-ordination game facing the two creditors is
shown in Table 4 below.
[Table 4. How Payoffs depend on Creditor Co-ordination]
The only new elements are the continuation values if both creditors choose to stay. As
before, we assume that unpaid interest is rolled-up and added to the coupon in period 2, so
there is no loss of value to the bondholders from a temporary exogenous shock if the
project continues. But creditors will not be paid in full if the sovereign does not put in good
effort. Let p be the probability of a exogenous shock drawn by nature and h denote the
hair-cut taken by creditors (due to bad effort by the debtor) footnote . With probability p,
each debtor obtains 1  rb at t  2 while with probability 1 − p, each creditor suffers a
hair cut, h, at t  2; therefore, conditional on the default at t  1, the expected payoff to
each creditor at t  2 is 1  rbp  1  rb − h1 − p  1  rb − h1 − p).
After normalisation, the payoff matrix will have the same structure as before; and
therefore the set of equilibria remains unchanged. In this section, we will focus on the
mixed strategy equilibrium where either creditor quits with probability q. Since either one
leaving triggers disorderly default, the continuation probability is 1 − c  1 − q2 where
c is the probability of disorderly default.
What if the need to provide incentives for the debtor to put in good effort is used as a
principle for selecting equilibrium? Assume that the continuation outcome, where neither
quits, cannot be the part of a sub-game perfect equilibrium where the debtor chooses to put
in effort (i.e. assume that a debtor, whose funding is guaranteed, will inevitably be tempted
to put in bad effort). By contrast, the outcome where creditors quit for sure will certainly
give debtor an incentive to put in effort: but it is socially inefficient as any temporary
exogenous shock will trigger a liquidity crisis. The mixed strategy equilibrium should
provide some incentives the debtor: but will this be socially efficient?
Debtor moral hazard and incentive compatible
randomisation
The source of moral hazard in our model is that the sovereign debtor has incentives that
are not aligned with those of the creditors. Funded by resources borrowed in the
international bond markets, we assume that the sovereign debtor receives ‘private payoffs’
when the project terminates at t  1 or at t  2. To begin with, we assume that these
payoffs are essentially ‘non-contractible’, i.e. cannot be attached by the creditors in
settlement of their claims nor can the sovereign debtor make a credible commitment to
transfer these payoffs to the creditors. If funds are used to subsidise a public corporation,
for example, the assets of the corporation are not attachable even though the sovereign has
waived immunity: so these assets would count as private payoffs. Funds transferred to
private citizens fall in the same category: the added popularity of the government is not
something that creditors can attach either.
We further assume that the value of these debtor payoffs depends on whether ‘effort’ is
good or bad, where good effort implies that default only occurs with the bad exogenous
shock but bad effort implies that default is inevitable. Good effort could correspond to a
situation where, for instance, money is borrowed and used to promote R&D in the export
sector to help the country remain internationally competitive. Bad effort might correspond
to transferring borrowed money to rich people who are free to put it in tax havens overseas,
exposing the country to currency risk and the budget to a loss of tax revenue. (An
alternative interpretation, suggested by James Tobin, would be that good effort corresponds
to properly regulated liberalisation of domestic financial markets and bad effort
corresponds to un-regulated financial liberalisation. footnote )
Let utG and utB denote the expected, discounted payoffs (measured at t  1) for the
sovereign debtor when the project is terminated at period t, t  1,2. We assume, for
simplicity, that there is no residual value of the project after paying for debt service and
repayment, so utG and utB consist of the non-contractible benefits to the sovereign. Suppose
utG  utB for all t. In that event, there is no solution to the debtor moral hazard problem
without a bankruptcy procedure because, ex ante, the sovereign debtor will always choose
the bad effort even if the project is terminated in period 1. The intermediary case, which we
study below, is when u1G  u1B but u2G  u2B. This is shown in Fig. 5 where BB, the schedule
showing expected payoff to bad effort, is steeper than GG which gives the expected payoff
to good effort. If the probability of continuation 1 − , was equal to 0, second-period
payoff would of course be irrelevant. As 1 −  increases to one, however, the prospect of
continuation with high private benefits makes bad effort (‘shirking’) more attractive.
[Fig.5. Debtor moral hazard: The no-shirking constraint]
To ensure that the sovereign chooses good effort, the probability of continuation must
not exceed 1 − m where the two schedules intersect in Fig. 5. It follows that the
equilibrium selected in the creditor coordination game must satisfy a ‘no shirking’
constraint associated with debtor’s moral hazard. Conditional on default, if creditors
always choose to stay, the debtor’s ex-ante incentives to choose good effort will never be
satisfied. The other extreme situation is when creditors always quit after default. This will
solve the debtors incentive problem but is obviously socially inefficient as a debtor
applying his best efforts would nevertheless face certain default in the presence of a
unfavourable temporary shock. An intermediate solution is that creditors coordinate on the
mixed strategy equilibrium. As the continuation probability at the mixed strategy
equilibrium, 1 − c, is derived independently of debtor incentives, there is no reason why it
should coincide with the continuation probability 1 − m associated with the no-shirking
constraint. Of course, the creditors could panic and choose the pure strategy of quitting: by
assuming that, where it is incentive compatible, creditors coordinate on the mixed strategy
equilibrium in the event of default biases, our analysis is biased in favour of the market
solution.
These results are summarised in Fig. 6. On the vertical axis is plotted 1 − c, the
probability of continuation given the mixed strategy equilibrium of the creditor
co-ordination game, while on the horizontal is plotted 1 − m, the continuation probability
required for time-consistency or ‘subgame perfection’ on the part of the debtor. The shaded
part of the figure shows the excess default probabilities relative to second best. footnote 
[Fig.6. Excessive probability of disorderly default]
Let NEC denote the Nash equilibrium continuation probability, where NEC ≡ 1 − c
 1 − q2 when 1 − q2  1 − m and NEC  0 otherwise; and let ICC denote the incentive
compatibility continuation probability, 1 − m. Then the above discussion can be
summarised as:
Proposition Almost always, NEC  ICC.
How providing the right incentives for the debtor almost always leads to excessive
crises is shown graphically in Fig. 7. Creditor payoffs and the three Nash equilibria of the
co-ordination game are shown in top left panel. The non-contractible payoffs to the debtor
are shown in the top right panel and ICC, the maximum probability of continuation
compatible with good effort, is shown as 1 − m on the horizontal axis (below the
intersection of GG and BB at I). How does this incentive compatibility constraint affect the
selection of equilibrium for creditors? Clearly it rules out equilibrium at C (Stay, Stay). It
is, however, consistent with the mixed strategy equilibrium at B. This can be seen (in the
bottom right panel) by comparing the incentive compatibility constraint, 1 − m, with the
continuation probability associated with the mixed strategy equilibrium, 1 − c. The latter
is the square of the individual continuation probability 1 − q (see lower left panel) where
this, in turn, is derived footnote from the mixed strategy equilibrium B (as shown in the
top right panel).
[Fig.7. Creditor co-ordination and debtor moral hazard]
Although the level of randomisation in the mixed strategy equilibrium is consistent
with the debtor putting in effort (as 1 − m ≥ 1 − c), there is ‘too much’ randomisation
(measured by distance xx’ in the figure) as a higher continuation probability among
creditors would also be incentive compatible. It is in this sense that the mixed strategy
equilibrium is inefficient and the excess randomisation is indicated by the shaded triangle
in the diagram.
This inefficiency would greatly increase, however, if the continuation probability from
the co-ordination game were to rise above 1 − m (i.e. if point B were to approach
sufficiently close to C). In that case, the only credible equilibrium consistent with debtor
incentive is where both creditor quit as soon as default occurs. The excess randomisation in
this case, 1 − m, is shown by the shaded box in the lower right panel.
Only at the point E is the Nash Equilibrium randomisation equal to the incentive
compatible randomisation. This is what leads to the conclusion that, in the absence of
bankruptcy style procedures, there will almost always be excessive disorderly default in
sovereign bond markets. This is true even when we make the favourable assumption that
creditors choose the most efficient incentive compatible equilibrium.
Implications for sovereign spreads
To simplify the analysis, we have treated the interest rate as predetermined. In reality,
however, sovereign spreads would be endogenous, varying with the equilibrium selected.
Ideally footnote , we would extend the theory to explain how interest rates are determined
and test the predictions of the extended model on relevant data. For present purposes, we
restrict ourselves to indicating briefly how our model might be calibrated to fit recent data.
As discussed in the introduction, emerging market sovereign spreads over US Treasuries
responded sharply to the Russian default. From a level of between 400 and 500 basis points
earlier in 1998, they peaked at over 1600 after the Russian default in August and then fell
to somewhere between 700 and 800 in 2000. In 2001, Argentine debt suffered spreads of
2000 basis points and above, as did Brazilian debt in the summer of 2002. (After leaving
the currency peg, Argentina has recorded even higher spreads of around 7000 basis points.)
In Table 5, illustrative parameters are chosen so as to generate sovereign spreads that vary
over a range running from 300 to 7000 bps. Case 1 with low quit probability and high risk
of bad shock, quitting is risk dominant and the mixed strategy is consistent with spread of
800 basis points. In case 2 with high quit probability and low risk of bad shock, neither
quitting nor staying are risk dominant (see discussion in Section 3 above) and sovereign
spreads can rise to 7000 basis points.
The sovereign spread, S, is calculated using the formula:
S  p1 − R and 1 −   1 − q2, so S  1 − 1 − q2p1 − R
where p is a probability of a bad shock,  is a conditional probability of termination given
default, q is the individual quit probability in the mixed strategy equilibrium and R is the
recovery rate on debt. In Eichengreen and Bordo (2001), it is reported that, from
1973-1997, a randomly-selected country (from a sample of 56 countries including OECD
numbers) had probability of experiencing crisis of 12 % per annum. Given the higher
incidence of crises in emerging market countries, we choose a figure of 0.16 to characterise
the probability of crisis in the mixed strategy equilibrium for emerging markets. Setting p
at 0.16 and combining this with a value of 0.5 for 1 − R, Cline and Barnes (1997), this
implies a sovereign spread of 800 basis points, or 8 percentage points at the mixed strategy
equilibrium, see line 2 of Table 5, Case 1. Note that, in this case, the continuation
probability conditional on default is set at 0.6 (in line with the earlier discussion in Section
3 above): this implies a value of 0.4 for  and a quit probability, q, of 0.23 as shown in
bold in line 2. In Case 2, where the recovery rate is cut to 30 %, and q is set at 0.5, the
continuation probability falls by more than half to 0.25, as shown in bold in the lower half
of the table.
The sovereign spreads associated with the mixed strategy equilibrium will fall on the
application of a ‘second-best’ strategy of Constructive Ambiguity. Assume, for example,
that the lowest rate of termination consistent with good effort is m  0.2. This policy
would reduce sovereign spreads to 400 bps or about 300 bps, depending on the value of p,
see the first row of each case. If, on the other hand, moral hazard problems were
sufficiently severe to shift the market equilibrium to the pure strategy of quitting whenever
technical default occurred, sovereign spreads could rise sharply. In Case 1 where the
increase in termination probability more than doubles, spreads widen to 2000 basis points:
in Case 2 where termination is quite likely in any case, sovereign spreads rise to around
1500 basis points.
Given the moral hazard constraint, selecting the pure equilibrium of stay/stay would
remove the incentive to put in effort and increase the probability of termination to 1
unconditionally. In this case, sovereign spreads rise to 5000 or 7000 as shown in the
bottom line of each case.
[Table 5. Sovereign Risk: Illustrative examples]
Note that changes in interest rates as between the mixed strategy and the pure strategy
of quitting are, in fact, likely to change the default probability. Taking into account of this
could lead to models of self-fulfilling crises such as those of Aghion et al. (2000) and
Sachs et al. (1996).
Possible perverse effects of un-regulated financial
liberalisation
Financial liberalisation in the absence of appropriate regulation can increase the risk of
financial crisis (Goldstein, 1997; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). In the framework
developed here, this can come about through a fall in 1 − m, together with an increase in
1 − c. The former, the tightening of the ‘no-shirking constraint’, could occur if
liberalisation makes it more attractive to pursue the bad effort strategy – if it makes it
easier to ship money out of the country to evade taxes, for example footnote . This
increases the pay-offs to low effort and, as shown by the upward shift from BB to B’B’ in
Fig. 8, shifts the intersection with GG to the left, which reduces the incentive compatible
continuation probability (to 1 − m′ ). If the mixed strategy equilibrium of the co-ordination
game remains at 1 − c, however, it may still satisfy the incentive compatibility condition
and there will be no effect on equilibrium, see figure. But what if liberalisation also cuts
the cost of exit in the co-ordination game? (A fall in legal costs makes quitting more
attractive: so, in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the probability of staying must be
increased to balance the expected pay-offs of quitting and staying – and this increases the
continuation probability of the game.) The new mixed strategy equilibrium could then fall
afoul of the no-shirking constraint, as shown by 1 − c′ in the figure: hence, in the face of
default for any reason, only the threat of certain withdrawal will be sufficient to check
debtor’s moral hazard. The results could be dramatic: as shown in Line 2 and 3 of the table
above, a shift from the mixed strategy equilibrium to the pure strategy equilibrium could
raise the sovereign spread from 800 to 2000 bps.
[Fig.8. Possible effects of badly-designed liberalisation]
Is this more than a theoretical curiosome? As Tobin (1999, p.73) notes: “In the ‘bailout’
packages for East Asian economies, further cross-border financial liberalization was one of
the conditions imposed by the IMF and the U.S. Treasury for official loans. This was a
surprising requirement, given the evident facts that excessive private external short-term
debt was, if not a cause of the crisis, a serious aggravation of it, and that banking and
financial institutions seemed to need more regulations in several respects as well as fewer
in other respects.” Pressure to increase competition in financial markets may also be
counter-productive in the absence of appropriate financial regulation (Hellman et al.,
2000).
Sovereign bankruptcy procedures as a
commitment device
We have seen that, in the absence of institutional innovation, there will be excessive
disorderly default in equilibrium. Can this be reduced by institutional change?
Where creditors can, in event of default, exercise some legal claim over the assets of
the sovereign state or its citizens, there is a good case for a bankruptcy procedure. This
might involve the following elements. Ex ante, the sovereign agrees to bargaining in good
faith after default, and to this end, establishes some ‘contractibility’ on assets in favour of
the creditors. This might involve waiving sovereign immunity and agreeing that some
foreign interest payments and loans footnote could be diverted in favour of creditors as
part of the bargaining process. Note that this enhanced ‘contractibility’ must also have the
effect of reducing private payoffs to the sovereign; otherwise it will not have the desired
incentive effects.
When a default occurs, however, the sovereign debtor is afforded protection by a
temporary stay on creditor litigation. This legitimises the suspension of payments and also
prevents litigation (by ‘vultures’) from inhibiting negotiations, Miller and Zhang (2000).
Furthermore, it provides a breathing space for a ‘discovery’ process where efforts are made
to establish the underlying causes of default (and to determine whether it was due to a bad
shock or poor effort). If this reveals the debtor to have made appropriate effort and to be
suffering from an exogenous shock, bargaining would involve debt restructuring – the
lengthening of debt maturities for temporary shock, and some write-down for a permanent
shock known to be outside the control of the debtor. But if the debtor is revealed to have
made little or no effort to arrange its financial and fiscal affairs, then it will be penalised
with payoffs changed ex post in ways that have been agreed ex ante. (It is to make this
possible that the debtor must have agreed to make some private payoffs contractible.)
Along similar lines, Eaton (2002, p.5) observes: “One role that an international
bankruptcy court could play is in clarifying the extent of the sovereign’s malfeasance in a
default, and applying penalties appropriately.” He goes on to note that: “Tougher sanctions
in response to malfeasance that leads to default is ultimately in the interest of sovereign
countries, as it enhances their access to credit”. This can be shown in Fig. 9 where an ex
ante agreement to transfer funds to the creditors in period 2 in event that default is
discovered to be attributable to low effort reduces the private benefits, swivels the BB
schedule clockwise and so increases the maximum continuation probability. If ex ante
contracting ensures that u2B is less than or equal to u2G, as shown by the lower dotted line in
the figure, then the maximum incentive-compatible continuation probability shifts to one
and the creditors can safely roll over their lending without fear of moral hazard. Even if the
moral hazard constraint does not rise to one, but only to 1 − m′ as shown in the figure,
bankruptcy procedures can reduce the termination probability without completely
eliminating them.
[Fig.9. Shifting the no-shirking constraint by ex ante contract]
Before turning to the institutional implications, consider two special cases. First is
where the reasons for default are known as soon as it occurs, i.e without a discovery phase.
Here, there is no need for an extended bankruptcy procedure. If the default is due to an
exogenous shock, liquidity can be provided right away. If the default is due to lack of
effort, then the debtor’s payoffs are changed ex post in ways that have been agreed ex ante.
This is perspective taken by Olivier Jeanne (2001) who argues that “the institution that
brings the economy the closest to the first-best is a ‘crisis insurance fund’ that bails out all
governments with a rollover crisis conditional on the fiscal adjustment”, (p.19, italics in the
original). Under his proposed scheme, moral hazard is neutralized by denying bailouts to
countries that have not implemented the fiscal adjustment. Jeanne notes, however, the crisis
fund would probably have to be a rule-based public agency, first because of ‘time to
verify’ footnote and second because private insurance contract for sovereigns cannot be
made contingent on fiscal effort which is under their control.
At the other end of the spectrum is the special case where the discovery phase is
completely unrevealing, so the indeterminacy as to the causes of default can never be
resolved. In these circumstances, the contractibility over private benefits cannot be
exploited, and ‘constructive ambiguity’ appears to be the only solution – where all
defaulting debtors are bailed out with probability 1 − m, and the expected costs to
creditors are reflected in sovereign spreads as discussed earlier.
Institutional implications
If financing development by issuing bonds exposes emerging markets to excessive
crisis, one response is to limit the use of such debt instruments, Rodrik (1998). Some
economists (e.g. Stiglitz, 1998; Williamson 1995, 1999) have discussed the use of explicit
inflow controls such as those used in Chile intended to change the composition of flows in
favour of longer term investment rather than hot money. footnote As Cordella (1998)
points out, inflow controls which succeed in shifting the structure of external financing
may increase rather than decrease the total volume of finance available for development:
“taxes on short-term capital flows by avoiding rational panics, can improve the expected
returns of investments in emerging markets, and thus increase the total volume of funds
entering the country”, (p.6). In time of crisis, however, the use of outflow controls may
well be considered, both as a way of conserving scarce foreign currency and of lowering
domestic interest rates, Krugman (1998).
Rogoff (1999, p.37-8) too has concluded that “the main problem with the present
system is that it contains strong biases towards debt finance”. To mitigate this bias, he
argues for a reversal of legal trends which have enabled creditors to enforce emerging
markets debt contracts in industrialised country courts – an argument for the restoration of
sovereign immunity. footnote It is acknowledged that this recommendation would lead to a
contraction in the issuance of sovereign market bonds; and he observes that “instituting an
international bankruptcy court might be an alternative means to the same end”.
The debate between John Taylor and Anne Krueger is, of course, premised on the
widespread continuation of bond finance for emerging markets countries without sovereign
immunity, as is our own discussion of the bankruptcy procedure – where we see an
important role for a rule-governed public agency to supply a commitment mechanism
which makes private payoffs accessible to the creditors ex post. It may be that the required
control over the ex post behaviour of the debtor could be achieved by official “IMF
conditionality” which governs the actions of the sovereign whose debt is being
restructured. (Applicants for debt restructuring in the Paris Club are required as a matter of
course to agree a programme with the IMF before negotiation with creditors begin.) Thus
IMF programmes could play an important role in the international bankruptcy procedure
described above. footnote To check moral hazard, of course, it would have to be known in
advance that ‘conditionality’ would be used to achieve the contractibility of private
payoffs, i.e. the ‘rules’ need to be clear.
As an alternative to an SDRM, Collective Action Clauses have the attraction that they
are voluntary and market driven. As discussed earlier, however, there are two problems of
implementation, first the need to replace outstanding contracts, by swaps for example, and
second the need to aggregate across different instruments, possibly by two-stage debt
swaps, see Table 6. Even supposing both can be solved, we believe that private bond
contracts, which are typically incomplete and involve creditors deciding what to do ex post,
are unable to deliver the required degree of protection and pre-commitment. Contracts
incorporating Collective Action Clauses do not prevent creditors from suing provided a
sufficient majority in favour, Thomas (2002). Moreover, contracts with majority action
clauses may fail to be renegotiation proof after a discovery phase in which the debtor is
effort level is confirmed to be ‘bad’, as the debtor may renege on commitments to make
ex-post transfers. In other words, a hold-up problem may ensue as now the sovereign
debtor has all the bargaining power. footnote Anticipating this, even with majority action
clauses, creditors may choose to terminate the project.
[Table 6. CACs and SDRM: Some key issues]
An SDRM backed by an international organisation, acting on behalf of the international
community, can solve such a hold-up problem by making the sovereign’s payoffs
attachable ex-post. In other words, our analysis of the reason for excessive crisis leads us to
choose an SDRM mechanism rather than private contracts. The implementation of the
SDRM will, however, require a super-majority vote to change the Articles in the IMF,
something that United States can block. Even assuming that the Articles can be changed,
two delicate issues need to be considered: whose private payoffs should be attached ex
post; and to whom should responsibility for overseeing such attachment be delegated?
The former is the matter of political economy. What if, in a crisis, those responsible can
exit, leaving debt for others to pay? In extreme cases, sovereign debtors may appeal to the
principle of ‘odious debt’ where a state may justifiably repudiate obligations incurred by
tyrants no longer in power (Birdsall and Williamson, 2002, and Kremer and Jayachandran,
2001). But assuming that this does not apply, is it efficient or fair to punish those who
could not exit? It appears that in Argentina, for example, rich and well-informed citizens
were able to take their capital out of the country, thus avoiding the precipitate depreciation
of the peso. footnote If rich private residents have made enormous capital gains in local
currency by exporting dollars from the country – now in default for lack of dollars to
service its debt – should they not participate in the cost of clearing up the ensuing chaos?
Could the state not demand payment of capital gains tax on the assets “marked to market”,
for example; or in extremis enforce repatriation in order to ensure the realisation of capital
gains (and a massive inflow of dollars)?
Even if one could think of such devices for making private payoffs contractible, what
public agency should implement them? Stiglitz (2002b) argues that, being dominated by
creditors’ interests and having adopted the ‘free market mantra of 1980s’, the IMF is not
well suited to devise and implement strategies for remedying capital market failures. In
response to financial crises in East Asia and Latin America, the organisation has
nevertheless shown itself willing to contemplate inflow controls and standstills as part of
an SDRM – though recommending outflow controls (and enforced repatriation) would not
be consistent with its normal practices and procedures.
Conclusion
Calvo’s critique of the conventional wisdom – the Washington Consensus – is that
market failures in emerging market finance are far too important to be ignored. footnote 
Tirole (2002, p. ix-x) evidently shares the same perspective: his recent book on financial
crises begins by referring to the wide consensus that has emerged among economists that
“capital account liberalisation ... was unambiguously good. Good for the debtor countries,
good for the world economy” but goes on to note “that consensus have been shattered
lately. A number of capital account liberalizations have been followed by spectacular
foreign exchange and banking crises.” Like Tirole, we have focussed on the problems that
can arise from contracts which pose problems of creditor coordination. For simplicity we
have assumed that creditors all share the same information: but the information
asymmetries stressed by Calvo would (as the Appendix suggests) greatly enrich the
analysis.
Solving creditor co-ordination problems in sovereign bond markets is, however, subject
to a moral hazard constraint: that debtors must retain the incentive to service their debts. In
a model of sovereign illiquidity with three Nash equilibria facing creditors, it is quite likely
that this incentive constraint rules out the no-crisis equilibrium, and either the mixed
strategy equilibrium or the pure strategy where all creditors quit will be selected,
depending on how severe the incentive problem is. In general, however, the termination
probability is higher than necessary for incentive purposes, i.e. there are too many crises.
How can bond markets be made more efficient? We consider a bankruptcy procedure
involving temporary stay on creditor litigation and discovery process for determining the
underlying causes of default. A key element of the procedure is that when the sovereign
debtor in default is found to have made little or no effort, its private payoffs will be
reduced ex post. To provide the right incentives, it is crucial that the mechanism for doing
this should have been agreed ex ante, as would be true if a ruled-governed public agency is
involved. Moreover, as we have argued, privately issued bond contracts are unlikely to
achieve the same result. We believe that the institutional approach to sovereign debt
restructuring proposed by the IMF is, in principle, capable of increasing bond market
efficiency. What the rules should be – and whether the IMF as currently constituted is the
appropriate public agency to implement them – are policy issues that remain to be
discussed.
The framework developed here could be used to look at contagion in capital
markets. footnote Masson (1999, p. 267), for instance, argues that “pure contagion
involves changes in expectations that is not related to country’s macroeconomic
fundamentals” and suggests that “by analogy to the literature on bank runs (Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983), attacks on countries which involve a simultaneous move from a non-run to
a run equilibrium seem to be relevant for recent experience in emerging market countries”.
To include contagion on this definition, we need only relax the assumption that the market
selects the most efficient incentive compatible equilibrium between creditors: a move from
a mixed strategy equilibrium to the pure strategy of quitting unconnected with any change
in fundamentals would count as contagion on Masson’s definition; and, as Table 5
indicates, could double sovereign spreads. In future research, we intend to include the
determination of sovereign spreads within the analysis; and to combine creditor
heterogeneity and insolvency shocks with debtor moral hazard. Another useful extension
would be to take account of the politics of decision-making within a debtor country and
how it interacts with the debt crises.
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Appendix: Extensions to the model
Robustness: The case of n creditors
In this section, we show that with n identical creditors, the equilibrium analysis of the
creditor coordination game is robust i.e. there continue to exist only two pure strategy
equilibria where all creditors either choose to quit or stay; and, in addition there is at least
one other mixed strategy equilibrium where each creditor quits with some probability q,
0  q  1.
The time line of events is as in Section 3. A sovereign is embarking on a bond-financed
investment project, costing K′, which lasts only two periods. All finance is now supplied by
n identical creditors each of whom has invested b, and is promised a return of r in the first
period and 1  r in the second period. So long as resources available cover these
payments (i.e. cash flow in period 1 is greater than nrb and cash flow in period 2 is greater
than 1  rnb), all is well and the project will run to completion.
As before, there is an unanticipated, exogenous temporary shock (‘bad luck’) that
lowers the sovereign’s capacity to pay in period one the amount that is due to bond holders
under their contract. This is a liquidity shock so that the project net worth is unchanged,
but, as the failure to comply with the terms of the debt contract constitutes technical
default, the sovereign is exposed to the risk of a liquidity crisis if sufficient creditors seek
to accelerate their claims. Here, we assume that acceleration requires a minimum of 25% of
the creditors to act.
The co-ordination game facing the n creditors can then be specified as follows. Label
an individual creditor by i, i  1, ...,n. Each creditor chooses an action ai ∈ Quit, Stay .
For an action profile a  a1, ...,an, let Na,Q  i : ai  Q and Na,S  i : ai  S. Let
N be the set of integers between n4 and n. Consider the function g̃ : N →  such that
g̃x min1  rb,Q/x − L, x  n and g̃n  Q/n − L. Consider also the function
l̃ : N →  such that l̃n − x max Q−1rbxn−x , 0, x  n. Remark that l̃n − x is
well-defined for all x ∈ N as we must have 1  rbn  Q: otherwise, the sovereign debtor
would have had enough resources to service her debt i.e. would not have defaulted in the
first place. Then the payoffs to creditors can be specified as follows. Suppose a is such that
x  #Na,Q ≥ n4 . Then, if ai  Q, the payoff to creditor i is g̃x, while if ai  S, the payoff
to creditor i is l̃x. Now suppose a is such that #Na,Q  n4 . Then, if ai  Q, the payoff to
creditor i is 1  rb − L′, while if ai  S, the payoff to creditor i is 1  rb, where L′  0
and L  L′. The legal costs, L′, reflect the fact that an individual creditor, who
unsuccessfully tries to accelerate the project, pays a small legal fee for doing so but as the
project is not terminated obtains his continuation payoff 1  rb.
As before, we find it convenient to work with normalized payoffs. Define the function
g : N →  such that gx is decreasing in x, gx  0 for x  n and gn  0. Consider
also the function l : N →  such that ln − x is decreasing in x and ln − x  0 for all
x ∈ N. Suppose a is such that x  #Na,Q ≥ n4 . Then, if ai  Q, the payoff to creditor i is
gx while if ai  S, the payoff to creditor i is ln − x. Now suppose a is such that
#Na,Q  n4 . Then, if ai  Q, the payoff to creditor i is 1 −  while ai  S, the payoff to
creditor i is 1 where   0. As explained above,  captures the fact that an individual
creditor who unsuccessfully tries to accelerate the project, pays a small but strictly positive
cost and therefore receives a continuation payoff of 1 net of this cost.
As before, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, one where all creditors choose to
quit and another where all creditors choose to stay. There are no other pure strategy Nash
equilibria.
Next, we show that there is at least one other mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where
all n creditors randomly choose to quit with probability q, 0  q  1. Fix an individual
creditor i. Then, from the perspective of this creditor, there are n − 1 creditors choosing to
quit with probability q and stay with probability 1 − q. It follows that her payoff from
quitting will be given by the expression
∑
x1≥ n4
n − 1
x
qx1 − qn−1−xgx  1  ∑
x1 n4
n − 1
x
qx1 − qn−1−x 1 − 
while her payoff from staying would be given by the expression
∑
x1≥ n4
n − 1
x
qx1 − qn−1−xln − x  ∑
x1 n4
n − 1
x
qx1 − qn−1−x.
At a mixed strategy equilibrium, the payoff from quitting must be equal to the payoff
from staying. By computing, it follows that this condition is equivalent to requiring that the
following polynomial fq has a zero in the open interval 0,1 where fq is given by the
expression
∑
x1 n4
n − 1
x
qx1 − qn−1−x   rq
 ∑
x1≥ n4
n − 1
x
qx1 − qn−1−xln − x − gx  1
where rq  0 if n isn’t exactly divisible by 4 and is given by the expression
n − 1
n
4 − 1
q n4 1 − q 34 n−1
when n is exactly divisible by 4. Again, by computation, it follows that f0    0 while
f1  l1 − gn  0. As fq is a polynomial in q and therefore continuous in q, it
follows that there is a solution to fq  0 at some q ∈ 0,1. Therefore, there is at least
one mixed strategy equilibrium where all creditors randomly choose quit with some
probability q, 0  q  1.
Asymmetric information between creditors
Assume that after a sovereign default, there is incomplete information about whether
the adverse shock is temporary or permanent i.e. whether the underlying problem is one of
liquidity or insolvency. There are two states of the world  ∈ P,T where P denotes a
permanent shock which has an irreversible effect on the debtors net worth and on the
continuation payoff of the creditors and T denotes a temporary shock which only has a no
effect on debtors net worth and nor on the continuation payoff of the creditors. Nature
selects one of these two states of the world according to the prior probability distribution
, 1 − . Once the state of world nature is chosen, each player receives a signal
i ∈ P,T which is privately observed by each individual creditor and independently
distributed across creditors with p  Pri  |  12 , for i  1,2 and   P,T. Payoffs
depend upon state of nature and on creditor’s action as shown in the table below.
[Table 7. State dependent payoffs]
A strategy for a creditor is a map from his signals to actions. We focus on Bayesian
equilibrium strategy profiles.
We remark that the strategy profile where both creditors quit whatever their signal is
always a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium: given that the other creditor always quits,
quitting is a dominant action for each individual creditor.
However, under certain restrictions on parameters, another pure strategy Bayesian
equilibrium exists, namely one where each creditor chooses to quit if i  P and stays if
i  T. Although at first sight this Bayesian equilibrium is appealing, as we show later in
this subsection, it is also ex-ante inefficient. Conditional on a individual creditor observing
some signal, let s denote the probability that the other creditor observes the same signal.
Note that s  p2  1 − p2. footnote For any individual creditor, conditional on i  P,
the expected payoff from quitting is 0  1 − s  0 which is always greater than the
expected payoff from staying, s − 1 − sK1 − 2p  0 as p  12 . For any individual
creditor, conditional on i  T, the expected payoff from quitting is s while the expected
payoff from staying is 1 − s  sK2p − 1. For staying to be a best response, we need the
condition that s ≤ 1 − s  sK2p − 1, or equivalently | || |K2p−1 ≤ s. Remark that s is
a measure of the correlation of the signals privately observed by individual creditors and
|| is a measure of the disadvantage of being the second mover in the creditor grab race.
The inequality | || |K2p−1 ≤ s can be now be interpreted as saying that the more costly it is
to be the second mover in the creditor grab race, the more correlated the privately observed
signals have to be across creditors for the above strategy profile to be a Bayesian
equilibrium.
In a first best situation, where the state of the world is common knowledge, termination
should occur only when the shock is permanent, hence the project is terminated with
probability . In the Bayesian equilibrium where both creditors withdraw irrespective of
their signal, however, the probability of project termination is one. In the Bayesian
equilibrium where each creditor chooses to quit if i  P and to stay if i  T, the
probability of termination is 1 −   p2  2p1 − p − 2p1 − . Remark that if p  1,
this expression is equal to . By computation, it can be confirmed that the derivative of this
expression is 2 − p. When,   p, there is excessive project termination relative to the
first best, while if   p there is too little project termination relative to first-best. It
follows that the Bayesian equilibrium randomisation is almost always inefficient relative to
first best.
Now, consider a direct revelation mechanism where the creditors announce their signals
to the mechanism designer and the mechanism designer terminates the project with
probability one if both creditors announce bad signal; terminates the project with some
exogenous probability x if one creditor announces a good signal and another creditor
announces the bad signal; and continues the project with probability one if both creditors
announce the good signal. The associated probability of termination is
1 −   p2  2xp1 − p − 2p1 − . It follows that by choosing x appropriately, a direct
revelation mechanism can always do at least as well as a Bayesian equilibrium and in some
cases i.e.   p, it can do strictly better. Observe that this mechanism is
incentive-compatible as truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy for each creditor. We
summarize this discussion by the following proposition.
Proposition The Bayesian equilibrium project termination is almost always inefficient
relative to first best. Moreover, a direct revelation mechanism does better.
 [B]  [approaches] 
Corporations Sovereign states
Self-organizing
creditors
19th century Britain:
Majority Action Clauses
London debt: Collective
Action Clauses.
New York Debt: Exit Consent/ Swaps
Court-ordered
restructuring
20th century USA:
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism (SDRM)
 [E] 
[Table 1. Debt restructuring: Two approaches]
 [B]  [payoffs1] 
Actions 2 QUITS 2 STAYS
1 QUITS Q/2 − L Q/2 − L min1  rb,Q − L maxQ − 1  rb, 0
1 STAYS maxQ − 1  rb, 0 min1  rb,Q − L 1  rb 1  rb
 [E] 
[Table 2. How Payoffs depend on Creditor Co-ordination]
 [B]  [payoffs2] 
Actions 2 QUITS 2 STAYS
1 QUITS 0 0   0
1 STAYS  0  1 1
 [E] 
[Table 3. Normalised expected, discounted payoffs for the co-ordination game]
 [B]  [payoffs3] 
Actions 2 QUITS 2 STAYS
1 QUITS Q/2 − L Q/2 − L min1  rb,Q − L maxQ − 1  rb, 0
1 STAYS maxQ − 1  rb, 0 min1  rb,Q − L 1  rb − 1 − ph 1  rb − 1 − ph
 [E] 
[Table 4. How Payoffs depend on Creditor Co-ordination]
 [B]  [example] 
q 1 − q 1 −   p 1 − R Spread
in bps
Spread
in %
Case 1: Low quit probability/high risk of bad shock
Second Best CA na na 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.5 400 4
Mixed strategy 0.23 0.77 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 800 8
Quit/Quit 1 0 0 1 0.4 0.5 2000 20
Stay/Stay 0 1 1 0 na 0.5 5000 50
Case 2: High quit probability/low risk of bad shock
Second Best CA na na 0.8 0.2 0.213 0.7 298 3
Mixed strategy 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.75 0.213 0.7 1280 13
Quit/Quit 1 0 0 1 0.213 0.7 1491 15
Stay/Stay 0 1 1 0 na 0.7 7000 70
 [E] 
[Table 5. Sovereign Risk: Illustrative examples]
 [B]  [issues] 
Problems of
Implementation
Problems of
Operation
Collective Action Clauses
(voluntary, market driven)
1. ‘Transition’
2. ‘Aggregation’
Not litigation proof
Not renegotiation proof
SDRM
(involuntary, statutory)
Change of IMF Articles needed Subject to geo-political &
ideological pressures
 [E] 
[Table 6. CACs and SDRM: Some key issues]
 [B]  [payoffs4] 
a) When   P the payoff matrix is
Actions 2 QUITS 2 STAYS
1 QUITS 0 0  
1 STAYS   −K −K
b) When   T the payoff matrix is
Actions 2 QUITS 2 STAYS
1 QUITS 0 0  
1 STAYS   K K
 [E] 
[Table 7. State dependent payoffs]
figure 1
t = 0
Creditors lend
Nature 
chooses 
shock
Default or 
no default
Creditors 
decide to 
stay or withdraw
t = 1 t = 2
Final payment
 to creditors
figure 2
Payoff to 
Creditor 2
Payoff to Creditor 1
(Stay, Stay)
(Quit, Stay)
(Stay, Quit)
(Quit, Quit)
1
1
A
B
C
ε
δ
figure 3
t = 0
Creditors lend
Nature 
chooses 
shock
Default or 
no default
Creditors 
decide to 
stay or withdraw
t = 1
t = 2
Early Later Never
When choice of effort is revealed
Debtors choose 
non-contractible 
effort
figure 4
Debtor
Nature Nature
Good effort Bad effort
No shock
(1-p )
Bad shock
(p )
No shock
(1-p )
Bad shock
(p )
No default Default Default Default
figure 5
Payoff to debtor
uB1
uG1
uG2
uB2
1−π1−πm
B
B
G
G
figure 6
1−πc
1−πm 1
E
1
SGP default probability
Mixed strategy equilibrium 
of co-ordination game
Pure strategy of default
figure 7
1-π
Payoff 
to Creditor 2 Nash Equilibrium
Randomisation
Payoff to debtor 
Incentive Compatible
Randomisation
1-πm
1-πc
1-πm
1-π
Payoff 
to Creditor 1
G
G
B
B
1-πm
1-π
(Stay, Quit)
(Stay, Stay)
(Quit, Quit)
(Quit, Stay) Socially inefficiency (Shaded)
1-π
1-q
1
1
1 1
11
1
Second best solution 
of moral hazard 
problem
B
C
A
I
E
b'
b
x x'
D
figure 8
Payoff to debtor
uB1
uG1
uG2
uB2
1−π1−πm
G
G
B
B
B'
B'
1−π'c1−π'm
I
I'
1−πc
figure 9
Payoff to debtor
uB1
uG1
uG2
uB2
1−π1−πm
G
G
B
B
B'
1−π'm
